Writing about the Korean Conflict (1950-1953) also called the Korean War
In the bitter cold of December 1950, a convoy of 3,200 U.S. Army troops came under withering fire from tens of thousands of Chinese infantrymen massed in the hills east of Chosin Reservoir, in North Korea.
Twelve hours later, about 1,500 Americans from the 7th Infantry Division were dead, more than 1,000 were wounded and most of the convoy’s 40 vehicles were charred hulks or in flames. The attack was the brutal conclusion of four days of assaults by the Chinese, and when it was over, only soldiers strong enough to stagger six miles to a U.S. Marine encampment escaped capture.
Survivors were decorated with a Presidential Unit Citation acknowledging that, even though the Army units were ill-prepared and poorly trained, without their resistance the Chinese likely would have swept south and achieved their larger goal of destroying a Marine force of 17,000.
“The fact is, this group kept the others from being annihilated,” said Bob Hammond, 67, of Anaheim, who was a 17-year-old Army artilleryman when he faced the onslaught that killed the six other members of his squad at Chosin Reservoir.
The story of Task Force Faith is a tale of collective anguish and official redemption. It also is emblematic of America’s broader struggle to come to terms with a war that began in confusion and ended in stalemate.
In the war’s opening months, the U.S. military, shrunken by demobilization, was a shadow of the force that had whipped Adolf Hitler and the Japanese military machine in World War II.
These questions about the performance of the troops and their leaders were agonizing to contemplate in the years after the Korean War. And for decades, many Americans chose simply to ignore or deny them. As a result, difficult issues arising from America’s “forgotten war” have remained largely out of sight for decades.
Now, however, some of these issues are finally receiving the scrutiny they deserve as official embarrassment over the conduct of the war subsides and as veterans, nearing the last years of their lives, seek to understand better what happened to them so many years ago.
For Army veterans of the Chosin Reservoir fighting, the negative perception of their performance has made the wait for official reconsideration long and painful.
Marines, Army Fight Over Battle Story
Though then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson called it the greatest defeat for American arms since the Civil War battle of Bull Run, Chosin Reservoir has been celebrated as a success for the encircled 1st Marine Division, which fought its way out of the trap, bringing along its equipment, its dead and wounded, and inflicting 40,000 Chinese casualties.
Some Marines, recalling this feat, have contrasted the corps’ performance with what they regarded as the Army’s failure. The story has been a lingering source of friction between members and veterans of the two services.
The reservoir campaign unfolded as part of a huge allied counteroffensive that began with MacArthur’s daring landing of U.S. forces at Inchon in September and was intended to capture all of North Korea--and end the war--by Christmas.
As part of this drive, MacArthur sent the 1st Marine Division and some units from the Army’s 7th Infantry Division on an offensive from the northeastern coast toward the Chinese border. But as the advance continued, American lines grew thin--and the Chinese became increasingly unhappy with the Americans’ approach. China moved 300,000 troops into North Korea in the late fall, although the Americans continued to believe that they would not jump into the war.
Korean War Memorial in Washington D.C. (I have always found this memorial to be just mesmerizing! I can feel the suffering by focusing on the statues.) |
While the Marine force included many battle-hardened officers and NCOs, the Army units were markedly weaker.
Some of the Army soldiers sent to Chosin Reservoir were hastily trained teenagers, who had been rushed to Korea from cushy garrison duty in Japan.
The Army units had meager supplies of ammunition, food and equipment. Many of the soldiers found themselves facing winter temperatures that fell to 40 degrees below zero with only light parkas and thin cotton pants for protection.
The Army brass told them that only a scattering of Chinese units was in the area. The soldiers set up three separate camps on the night of Nov. 27 without digging foxholes into the rock-frozen earth as military practice required or, in some cases, without setting up communication links so neighboring units could be contacted for help.
By 11 p.m., the soldiers found out that Army intelligence was wrong.
Hordes of Chinese infantrymen, some armed with captured U.S.-made Thompson submachine guns, announced their arrival with bugles, whistles and shepherd’s horns. Swarming through the camps in subzero weather, they killed some soldiers as they slept in their tents and destroyed vehicles, artillery and other equipment before they were repulsed.
Pvt. Hammond, assigned to the 57th Field Artillery, saw in the dawn’s light that only a few men in his unit were left to operate its six 105-millimeter guns.
Only slowly recognizing the extent of the threat, Army leadership first ordered the units to continue their mission.
According to historical accounts, Gen. Edward M. Almond, commander of the Army’s X Corps, flew in by helicopter and urged the men on: “Don’t let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stand in your way.”
Two days later, the brass ordered the troops to withdraw, though some senior Army leaders privately doubted that many would make it out. For four days, the task force held out against two Chinese divisions, who attacked at night and remained hidden during the day.
Except for Marine aircraft, the Americans had no support. An Army tank unit a few miles south tried briefly to join them--but turned around after two of its tanks were destroyed by the Chinese. American aircraft tried to airdrop supplies to the units, but some were lost to the enemy. In other cases, the wrong ammunition was sent.
The Chinese were carrying only light weapons, but they had large numbers of troops and were highly disciplined.
Many of the Army’s officers were killed or wounded in the first days at Chosin Reservoir.
Col. Allan D. MacLean, the commanding officer, ran out across the reservoir ice to greet what he thought was an American rescue mission. It turned out to be a Chinese column. He was wounded, then captured by the Chinese.
The new commanding officer, Lt. Col. Don Carlos Faith, on December 1, ordered the troops to form a convoy of trucks for a withdrawal. The wounded, then numbering 600, were piled in the vehicles and lashed onto hoods and fenders.
But the withdrawal began in disaster as a Marine Corsair fighter plane dropped a canister of napalm too close to the column, incinerating a dozen U.S. soldiers at the head of the convoy.
For the next 12 hours, the convoy moved sluggishly as Chinese marksmen picked off drivers and trucks broke down. Finally, with Faith dead and the column still six miles north of the Marine encampment, the convoy ground to a halt.
The Chinese troops swarmed in, shooting the wounded, lobbing grenades, setting other vehicles afire and taking the few unwounded soldiers prisoner.
Thomas Sealey, 68, then an 18-year-old private, was crouching under a broken truck with only five rounds remaining when the Chinese surrounded it and poked their bayonets in his direction.
For 33 months he was held prisoner, living on two boiled potatoes a day and watching weaker soldiers die in filth and despair. Over the next several days, the last soldiers straggled in to the Marine camp at Hagaru-ri. Only 385 members of an Army force that once numbered 3,200 were healthy enough to join the Marines in their withdrawal to the sea.
The Army soldiers’ battlefield ordeal was over. But a new fight soon began--over their reputation.
A Marine chaplain who had been at Chosin, Lt. Cmdr. Otto Sporrer, returned to the states to give news interviews and write an article deploring the Army’s performance.
Sporrer, who resented the fact that the Marines had been used in the Chosin campaign, said that some Army soldiers had thrown down their weapons.
Hear the pitter patter of tiny feet
It’s the U.S. Army in full retreat.
Responding to accusations from Sporrer and others, the Army had its inspector general study the units’ performance. He found no evidence to support the accusations. In the years after the war, Col. Faith was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor and the official Army history praised the soldiers.
Yet the stain on the Army units’ reputation has been difficult to erase.
In 1952, when U.S. military commanders in Asia proposed a Presidential Unit Citation to honor the American performance at Chosin, the Marine commander, Gen. Oliver Prince Smith, recommended inclusion of Marine components but not the Army units who fought nearby.
In recent years, some Marines, Army veterans and others have petitioned repeatedly to honor Army units as well. They cited documents from official Chinese archives showing that the Chinese had thrown two full divisions and an attached regiment--20,000 troops--at the task force. But the authorities demurred, saying that rules required them to abide by the judgment of the commander on the scene, Smith, the Marine general.
Last year, two groups of veterans again urged authorities to grant recognition to Task Force Faith. One group consisted of the directors of a veterans’ group called the Chosin Few, four-fifths of whose members are Marines.
In October, Navy Secretary Richard Danzig, who has authority over the Marines, signed a terse order calling for the Army units to be included in the citation for displaying “extraordinary heroism.” At a convention of the Chosin Few in Lancaster, Pa., on June 10, the veterans finally were honored.
Some Army veterans acknowledged that many of the soldiers at Chosin Reservoir were ill-prepared and that their officers made mistakes. But they deny that there was malingering and insist that, if any soldiers threw down their weapons, it was because they were malfunctioning or because they had no ammunition.
Merrill A. Needham Jr., a sociologist and writer who has pushed since 1993 to win recognition for the Army units, said that it made him “very emotional . . . to think of this unit, stripped of its honor.” That they “fought as long and hard as they did, basically unsupported, was miraculous,” said Needham, who has written a book, “Foot Soldiers,” about the long military tradition of Faith’s family.
Needham sees the soldiers as belonging to a centuries-old military tradition called the “forlorn hope"--a small band of warriors who are thrown into the path of likely destruction to slow an enemy’s attack.
With many soldiers’ bodies “left smoldering amid the wreckage of their trucks, or frozen in the ice of Chosin,” the Army units fit that definition, Needham wrote in a letter to one officer of the outfit.
The Army veterans, though, said that they now are trying to focus on the positive aspects of what happened, including the way some Marine veterans helped push the Pentagon bureaucracy to clear their names. “It was, really, the Marines that got it done,” Hammond said. And that may be a sign that, 50 years after the fighting, the wounds are healing.
One of the Bloodiest Wars in History
The Korean War was one of history’s bloodiest, a Cold War flash point that set the stage for American involvement later in Vietnam. It began on June 25, 1950, after Communist North Korea invaded South Korea. The U.N. entered the war in support of South Korea. The Soviet Union and China supported the North. The United States supplied about 90% of the troops and supplies that the U.N. sent to South Korea.
*Paul Richter covered the State Department and foreign policy for the Los Angeles Times out of its Washington, D.C., bureau.
“In the hills of North Korea by a lake of azure blue, rides a farmer in his ox cart on the road to Hargaru.
He is singing songs of history that his father taught to him, as his eyes survey the scenery that’s no longer gray and grim.
In his mind he hears the cannons, the reciolless rifle’s roar, and the chatter of the Burp guns, all around the Reservoir.
Mortars crashing, Carbines flashing, Screaming men and boys, Bugles, flares and Howitzers, A symphony of noise.
He is thinking of his childhood, when he saw the soldiers come, to this peaceful mountain valley, that had never heard a gun,
And he’s never understood it, he will always wonder why, why so many men had come there from so far away, to die.
How they fought with savage fury agonizing through the snow, fingers turning black with frostbite, Death was sweeping, to and fro.
MacLean and Faith, Commanders: Hodge, and thousands more, fought and froze, and bled to death at Chosin Reservoir.
In the hills of North Korea, by a lake of icy blue, there’s no monument to witness, and no crosses are in view.
Just some land of little value covered well by falling snow, but they say to listen carefully when the wind begins to blow,
And you will hear the ghostly bugles from the mountain pass, nearby. You may hear the battle spreading from the mountains to the sky.
Lives were ending, Futures pending, Fate was casting dice.
Some would live and some would die, Karma, carved in ice!
The battle long is over, but fought each night anew, in dreams of those who can’t forget;
They’re called “The Chosin Few.”
So, let the Veterans tell the stories, let the legend live and grow, let the Chosin be remembered with the Men of Alamo,
With Bastogne and with Wake Island, and the Bunker Hill Command, and wherever there’s courageous men to take a valiant stand.
Once they fought to save a nation, they could not have offered more, than the sacrifices made there at the Chosin Reservoir. In the bitter bloody battles, at the Chosin Reservoir.”
Labels: Bob Hammond, Chosin Reservoir, Los Angeles Times, Paul Richter
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